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apart: the sinking of the oil tanker the Prestige in Galicia in November 2002 and the
killing of 24 Chinese migrant workers at Morecambe Bay in the North West of England
in February 2004.  It begins by introducing the key features of the two cases, before
exploring how they might be described and understood as state-corporate crimes.  It
then identifies a tendency within the literature to analyse state-corporate crimes as
'moments of rupture' in the regulatory relationship.  Seeking to move beyond such
'moments of rupture, the paper argues for an understanding of regulatory relationships
as part of a broader regime of permission that seek the smooth and uninterrupted
accumulation of capital.   It thus identifies the 'process' that must be analysed as a
process of capital accumulation.  This process is illustrated by focussing on the
spheres of production and distribution in this story of capital accumulation. In the
course of describing the complex 'regime of permission', the paper uncovers a
structure of impunity that generally enables the most powerful architects and
beneficiaries of state-corporate crime.  Rather than seeing this as an epiphenomenon,
or a consequence of bias in criminal justice systems, the paper will argue that the basis
for impunity is a constituent part of into the system of accumulation.
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present our argument in order to make it clear that the paper uses the State Corporate
crime literature as a foundation, and the work of Tombs and Lasslett as its point of
departure to extend/deepen the S-C Crime critique.   We have also clarified further how
we conceptualise ‘moments of rupture’ and have sharpened our reflections on the
literature in order to show more clearly how the S-CC scholarship might be
strengthened.   The changes we have made in order to accomplish those aims are set
out in detail below.
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1) A re-written final section in the first para of the introduction sets out more precisely
how the S-CC literature locates the production of crime in the structures of capitalism
and points to literature on ‘empire crime’.
2) New material is introduced after the sub-heading From Regulatory Pathology to the
Regime of Permission (para 3 and first half of para 4, and opening sentences in paras
7 and 9 of this section), which makes more clear the (subtle) difference in our analysis
(how we need to view a broader system of production and entirety of social relations
that enable criminal and harmful practices to occur) vis-à-vis theirs (that normal political
economy of hydrocarbon production produces deviant outcomes) and the structure of
this section is re-oganised to reflect this
3) New material is introduced to the conclusion to clarify this perspective.  Here we
argue: “In neither case were the formative conditions of the criminogenic ‘event’ found
in particular decisions and actions or non-decisions and inactions of state or
government institutions.  There were elements we could describe as state initiated or
state facilitated, but those conditions don’t fully describe the state-corporate crimes
here.  The circumstances that led to the Prestige and Morecambe bay disasters can
only be partially explained using a concept of state-corporate crime.   The corporate
crimes we describe here emanate from an architecture of power in which states
guarantee corporations various privileges and infrastructural capacities.”  In order to
accommodate this, we have deleted the section on structures of impunity which gets in
the way of the core argument.
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presentation issues.
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State-Corporate Crime and the Process of Capital Accumulation: mapping a 
global regime of permission from Galicia to Morecambe Bay. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Studies in state-corporate crime, organised around a growing and relatively new agenda 
in corporate crime research, take the on-going and often symbiotic relationship between 
state/public actors and private actors (normally large corporations) as the point of 
departure for its analysis (Kramer et. al., 2002).  There are three major challenges to 
criminology that this approach implies.  First, by developing an analysis of power 
relations beyond the immediate circumstances of a particular moment, fixed in time, 
with very particular circumstances, it takes us beyond a paralysing fixation that 
mainstream criminology has with criminal ‘events’, a fixation that is of limited value 
because it does not allow us to view the conditions that produced those crimes as rooted 
in more on-going and ever-present social conditions of unequal power (Pearce, 1976).  
The state-corporate crime literature thus points consistently to a structure of political 
economy which creates the particular conditions that shape the relationship between 
states and corporations (Kramer et. al., 2002; Kramer and Michalowski, 2006).  In this 
sense, the literature seeks to develop an understanding of the social content of the 
relationship between states and corporations in modern liberal democracies.  A similar 
critical observation is made consistently in feminist analyses of male violence; which is 
conceived of as a form of violence that can only be understood as part of an on-going 
state of gendered power relations (Walklate, 2003: 127-129).    Second, moving from 
event to process poses a difficulty for more statist or administrative criminological 
approaches, since it shifts the terrain on which we search for who might be held 
Blinded Manuscript (Without authors names and affiliations) Click here to view linked References
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‘criminally’ responsible.  Third, this literature locates the production of crime in the 
structures of capitalism, not least in the drive for accumulation that shapes the 
relationship between states and corporations (the motivations for crimes the lack of 
control and regulatory structures and the relative impunity granted to corporate actors). 
The literature that points to ‘empire crime’ is particularly illuminating in this respect, 
highlighting as it does, the deep historical origins of state-corporate collusion (for 
example, Iadicola, 2010 and 2011 see also, Kauzlarich and Matthews, 2006). 
 
We develop the latter point later in this paper, and argue that understanding state-
corporate crime as part of a historically configured process of capital accumulation 
impels us to look beyond the actors and social relationships that are immediately visible 
in the circumstances of the ‘crime’ or ‘event’.   
 
The importance of understanding of state corporate crime as an historically and socially 
situated process is illustrated by our analysis of the sinking of the Prestige oil tanker in 
Galicia in November 2002 (an environmental catastrophe reportedly with greater 
economic and environmental costs than the Exxon Valdes spill; Carstens, 2003) and the 
killing of 24 Chinese migrant workers at Morecambe Bay in the North West of England 
in February 2004 (the worst industrial multiple fatality in the UK since the Piper Alpha 
disaster).    As we uncover the historically and socially situated immediate conditions of 
those cases, we argue that the Prestige disaster to some extent accounts for the 
conditions that produced the Morecambe Bay disaster.   We explain how we come to 
this conclusion in the discussion below, before returning to uncover the historical and 
broader social content of those ‘events’. 
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From Galicia to Morecambe Bay: connecting two criminogenic ‘events’ 
 
The sinking of the Prestige oil tanker in November 2002 created a spill that polluted 
thousands of kilometres of coastline and in terms of the ecological and economic 
damage suffered in the aftermath, was certainly the worst oil spill in Spain’s history and 
perhaps the worst in Europe’s history.  The immediate crisis was immeasurably 
worsened by the Spanish government’s order to tow the vessel out to sea, away from 
Spanish waters, despite warnings that the ship would not be able to withstand the storm 
conditions forecast for the area (Naucher, 2013).  In trying to remove the threat of both 
the environmental and political fall out from the spill, the Spanish government caused a 
further major rupture in the vessel and turned a manageable spill into the disaster of 
unmanageable proportions.  Had it followed its own protocols set out in the Spanish 
National Emergency Plan, it would have towed the vessel into the port to deal with the 
spill (Greenpeace, 2012).  Ángel del Real, Maritime Captain of the port of La Coruña 
gave the order to tow the vessel 160 km from the coast escorted by the Spanish Navy. 
The decision was approved by the Minister for Development, and later by the Prime 
Minister José María Aznar. The ship owners and the company of the rescue opposed the 
decision to tow the vessel away from the coast.  Moreover, it seems that the decision to 
change the direction of the vessel was also taken partly due to pressure from the French 
government (Catalán Deus, 2003; 82). 
 
Measured in terms of the impact on biodiversity and the environment, the collective 
cost of the catastrophe was huge.  The ‘black tide’ was certainly the biggest ecological 
disaster to hit the Spanish coast, and was possibly the most damaging oil spill in 
European history.  More than 2,000 km of coast were affected. Shellfish,  particularly 
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mussels, were badly affected, as were other staple seafoods.   For example, octopus 
catches fell by 50% in 2004 and 2005 in many areas.  The Spanish Society of 
Ornithology estimated the number of sea birds deaths caused by the oil at between 
115,000 and 230,000, one of the highest sea bird mortalities by non-natural causes ever 
seen (Ecologistas en Acción, 2012). These are aspect of the consequences of the 
disaster, related to the loss of biodiversity, are difficult to translate into monetary terms  
(Prada et. al. 2002).  At the same time, the cleaning and the restoration are collective 
costs that are measurable in monetary terms.  The cost of the post-disaster clean-up was 
estimated at around 107 million euros.1  The most affected people were relatively low 
paid workers in the fishing and seafood industry.  The impact on those sectors can be 
calculated in monetary terms according to the transformations in quantity and quality of 
the goods and services offered in the market (Varela et. al. 2002: 139). In 2003, the 
value of fishing and tourism lost totalled around 1.4 billion euros (ibid.: 148). This 
disaster is aggravated due to Galicia’s status as one of the poorest areas in Spain 
together with its dependence on natural marine resources (Surís & Garza, 2003: 317).  
 
The circumstances of this tragedy seem rather distant from the Morecambe Bay disaster. 
Yet, both tragedies can be understood as part of the same complex chain of events. It is 
a chain that is connected by the dramatic impact upon market conditions precipitated by 
the Prestige disaster.   One consequence of the Prestige disaster was the banning of all 
fishing and shellfish harvesting along the Western and Northern coasts of Spain.  The 
ban, combined with what was generally a poor harvest year in Europe, intensified 
demand for a number of seafoods, including cockles.  This intensification of demand led 
to pressure on other areas of shellfish production to maximise production in order to 
                                                 
1 Figures taken from eldiario.es, October 2014, available online http://www.eldiario.es/temas/prestige. 
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meet the demand. One of those areas was the west coast of Britain. In April 2002, it was 
reported that the price of cockles in the UK had soared from £200 per tonne in 2000 to 
£2,000 per tonne in the months prior to the disaster (The Independent, 29th April, 2002; 
The Guardian 7th February 2004).  The period between 2003 and 2004 was 
exceptionally good period for the cockle harvest in Morecambe Bay, making a 
significant increase in production possible.  High prices were sustained over the next 2-
3 years following the closure of the Galician cockling sites. In late 2004, 9 months after 
the disaster local newspapers in the North West of England were reporting the need for 
more migrant cocklers to meet a sustained demand.  
 
On 5th February 2004, 23 cockle pickers were drowned at Morecambe Bay on the 
English Lancashire coast.   The dead were immigrant workers from China who had been 
put to work on the cockle beds of the Fylde coast.  The tides at Morecambe Bay are 
notoriously quick and the area was known for its difficult currents and quick-sands. On 
the day of the disaster, the tide times allowed for only 3 hours of work before dusk, and 
the cockle pickers had begun work just as daylight was fading.  The fact that the cockle 
pickers were working under highly dangerous conditions was largely due to the 
intensification of global demand for cockles.   
 
At the time, major questions were asked about the negligence of the British state.  
Several clear warnings about the possibility of fatalities occurring at Morecambe Bay 
had gone unheeded. In June 2003, the local MP Geraldine Smith had written to the 
Home Office with concerns that inexperienced Chinese cocklers were being employed 
on a fifth of the wages of British workers and that the conditions that they worked under 
were more acutely dangerous than the conditions faced by their British counterparts. A 
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rescue of 40 workers from the sands occurred just 6 weeks before the disaster had been 
reported, yet no action was taken in response (Liverpool Daily Post, 7th December 
2005). 
 
Because we can identify a role played by the state in either producing or failing to 
prevent what happened in Galicia and in Morecambe Bay harms, they begin to look like 
archetypal state-corporate crimes.  That is, they appear to fit closely with a standard 
definition of state-corporate crime as “illegal or socially injurious actions that result 
from a mutually reinforcing interaction” between state and corporation (Kramer and 
Michalowski, 2006: 20).  It is this focus on the “mutually reinforcing interaction” 
between state and corporation that is the point of departure for our discussion in the 
following section.  
 
Beyond State-Corporate Antagonism  
 
Generally, when we analyse such crises of regulation, we impelled to look for a 
breakdown in the relationship between two, potentially antagonistic, parties (the state 
and the corporation).  Yet, as the literature on state-corporate crime illustrates clearly, 
often there no clear antagonism or opposition of interest in those relationships, since 
those crimes often occur as a result of commonly shared or mutual goals (Kramer, 1992; 
Aulette and Michalowski, 1993; Kramer et al. 2002).     
 
The state-corporate crime framework advances this approach by identifying two types 
of institutional relationships: those that are state-facilitated and those that state-initiated 
(Kramer et al., 2002; Bruce and Becker, 2007).  It is this duality that the literature uses 
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to explore the full complexity of state involvement in, and contribution to, the 
circumstances that lead to corporate crimes.  In the former case, state-corporate crimes 
are the result of negligence or inactivity on the part of the states or their regulatory 
agencies in ways that collusively facilitate corporations in the commission of state-
corporate crime.  Thus, the state fails to provide the necessary mechanism to effectively 
balance or control the corporate activity. Often, a concept of “nested contexts” is 
introduced to show there is always a political economy that shapes the conditions for 
state-corporate facilitated crime, particularly when failure of regulation are discussed 
(Kramer, 1992; Aulette and Michalowski, 1993; Matthews and Kauzlarich, 2000; 
Cruciotti and Matthews, 2006). In the case of the latter – state initiated crime - state 
institutions pursue pro-active strategies that play a leading role in the commission of 
state-corporate crimes.  Here, the state not only fails to regulate the private sector, but it 
has a paramount role in fostering the criminal activity that benefits corporations (see, for 
example, Rothe, 2006; Whyte, 2007).  
 
At the global level, international financial institutions such as the World Bank or the 
International Monetary Fund can play the same role as public institutions or nation-
states in facilitating or initiating corporate crimes (Friedrichs and Friedrichs, 2002; 
Wonders and Danner, 2006).  A variation in the literature points to corporate-facilitated 
and corporate-initiated state crimes, a modification which foregrounds the agency of the 
corporation and the primary casual nature of capital accumulation in state-corporate 
crimes (Matthews, 2006; Whyte, 2009; Lasslett, 2014).  
 
The state-corporate crime approach has been subject to some critique on the basis that it 
does not go far enough in revealing the social content of state corporate crimes.  As 
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Tombs (2012) has argued, for example, the state-corporate crime literature retains a 
tendency to focus upon the immediate circumstances of:  
discrete joint ventures between corporations and states, either at specific 
moments or towards specific ends, thus abstracting these from a more 
generalized set of social relationships, which are on-going, enduring and more 
akin, in fact, to a process. 
 
Similarly, Lasslett (2010: 212) has noted that this literature is characterised by its 
inability to concretise state-corporate crimes as part of a broader system of production 
and “orient the researcher to less evident, but extremely important social realities that 
inform the crimes of the powerful.” 
We would agree with both Tombs and Lasslett.  The description of our cases above 
provides the basis for launching an exploration of state-corporate crimes as events that 
are produced as part both of a more generalized set of social broader system of 
economic production.  We say this because the most apparent link across those cases 
seems to be that they are “crimes of the economy” (Ruggiero, 2013) in the sense that 
their circumstances are rooted in a classical political economy understanding of the 
human consequences of shifts in the forces of supply and demand that are shaped and 
co-ordinated in a global economy.  The abstraction that both Tombs (2012) and Lasslett 
(2010) point to in their critique of state-corporate crime, however, is something beyond 
the observable features of political economy.  They are concerned with the way that 
particular approaches to political economy produce an abstraction of social 
relationships.    
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In order to deepen their critique – and to begin to see how we might make social 
relationships more concrete in the analysis of state-corporate crimes - we argue that 
much of the scholarship in what Lasslett (ibid.) calls orthodox studies of crimes of the 
powerful tends to develop its analysis around a particular flaw or problem in the 
institutional relationship between the ‘state’ and the ‘corporation’, or what we call in the 
discussion that follows, a regulatory pathology.   Indeed, it is this understanding of the 
regulatory process that constitutes a primary example of the tendency to abstract social 
relationships that those previous critiques have identified.    
 
From Regulatory Pathology to the Regime of Permission 
 
The state-corporate crime literature has produced significant analyses of the subject of 
this paper: oil spills.   
 
Bradshaw’s discussion of the criminogenic structure of the industry represents a 
development of the conceptualisation of state-corporate crime by introducing the 
concept of ‘industry’ level to those of ‘institutional’, ‘organizational’ and ‘interactional’ 
levels that were firstly advanced by Kramer et al. (2002).  Thus, the article points to the 
competition between business organizations that lead to more “criminogenic industry 
structures” (p. 380), showing how governmental regulatory processes shape patterns of 
state-corporate harm. What is more, Bradshaw signals the role of the state apparatuses 
in fostering markets in the industry.   
 
In this vein, Cruciotti and Mathews’ (2006) article on the context that produced the 
Exxon Valdez spill highlights the importance of “a complex series of interactions 
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between social actors” (p. 149).  The paper, following Aulette and Michalowski (1993), 
argues that the “nested contexts” made this crime inevitable; that is, that societal, 
political and regulatory contexts established the basis for the crime to happen. The state-
corporate crime occurred, the authors say, as a result of the profit motive intersecting 
with a lax regulatory environment. Thus, we are encouraged not to see these events as 
‘accidents’, but as the result of a series of practices engaged in by a series of relevant 
actors.  But what is interesting in this chapter is that the authors go way beyond their 
conclusion that the disaster resulted from the “wrongful intersections of government and 
business.”  In doing so, they point to a more historically and socially complex set of 
circumstances, including: the way that automation had led to fundamental changes in 
the labour process; the origins of Alaskan state government in the 19th century Gold 
Rush; and the emergence of a political economy of speed following the discovery of oil 
in 1968 and the OPEC embargo of 1973.  Thus, the chapter actually goes much further 
in its analysis than simply elucidating some “wrongful intersections”, but develops a 
complex and historically situated political economy.   The paper in fact exposes a set of 
circumstance that are neither related to: a) the failure of government in fulfilling its in 
vigilando role; nor b) practices that were clearly initiated by the government authorities 
involved in taking decisions that led to the disaster.  The paper shows how both those 
‘state-initiated’ and ‘state-facilitated’ features were shaped by a deeper political 
economy of oil production.  
 
Indeed, neither Bradshaw nor Cruciotti and Mathews’ cases appear to us to be merely 
illustrating deviant state practices – rather they also illustrate practices that are 
constructed within those states as normal and acceptable.  Of course, the particular 
events that occurred can be understood as both deviant – and in any interpretation of 
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those terms – their effects are criminogenic.  But, the circumstances that led to the 
events cannot be regarded as deviant practices.  As Bradshaw indicates, the political 
economy of hydrocarbon production is rooted in a much greater human catastrophe – 
climate change – and yet this is constructed only as deviant when a major event like the 
Gulf of Mexico spill occurs.  Likewise, as we have indicated, Cruciotti and Mathews’ 
discussion of the Exxon Valdes case is rooted in a ‘normal’ political economy of 
hydrocarbon production that produces ‘deviant’ outcomes.  The implication of what we 
are arguing here is that the state-corporate crime approach usefully draws attention to 
some kind of constitutional flaw, or moment of rupture in the relationship between 
public (state) institutions and private (corporate) institutions.  It is this tendency in the 
literature to focus upon what might be called moments of rupture in the constitutional 
public/private relation that leads us to analyse state-corporate crimes in a particular way, 
impelling us to look at immediately apparent empirical conditions where public 
authorities have either colluded in ways that breach the normal constraints of their 
‘public’ role, or have failed to protect us, the public, from the harmful activities of the 
private (corporate) sector (Whyte, 2014).  
 
In this sense, we are arguing that state-corporate crime should not be pathologised.  
That is to say that state-corporate crimes are not necessarily accurately described  as 
“wrongful interactions” because they are not necessarily deviations from a normal 
social path or social state in which a ‘better’ relationship between government and 
corporation can guarantee protection from the process of capital accumulation.   Rather, 
corporate crimes are better understood as interruptions or unplanned phenomena that 
arise from the normal conditions of doing business.  As this article will argue, in order 
to fully understand the formative conditions of state-corporate crime, it is not enough to 
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look to regulatory pathologies; it is not enough to limit our analysis to the empirical 
conditions of regulatory ‘collusion’ and ‘failure’.  
 
How, then, could we think about the deeper architecture of corporate power in order to 
take us beyond the immediately observable conditions of those regulatory pathologies? 
We approach corporate crime and its regulation as a distillation of a range of social 
relationships, institutions and practices that exist prior to the immediately observable 
conditions and relationships that produced the criminal event. In doing so, this shifts our 
focus away from the moment of rupture towards a concern with recovering the social 
content and the historical context of those immediately observable relationships.  
 
We therefore note at this stage something that none of the state-corporate crime scholars 
we cite would disagree with: that states or governments do not merely facilitate or 
initiate criminal and harmful practices.  Rather, capitalist states produce the entirety of 
the social conditions that enable criminal and harmful practices to occur.  In capitalist 
social orders, states play a creative and enabling role for regimes of capital 
accumulation; corporations are the key institutions in realising capital accumulation.  
Governments establish the juridical and administrative framework for corporations, 
transport and communication infrastructures, and organise diplomatic relationships with 
states to enhance opportunities for import, export and investment and so on. States help 
to constitute capital, commodity, commercial and residential property markets; help to 
produce different kinds of ‘human capital’; constitute labour markets; regulate the 
employment contract; constitute corporations through the rules that permit particular 
forms of ownership; specify the rules of corporate liability and so on (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2015). 
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The corporation, in the sense that it is established formally, is permitted through its 
legal and political status to structure its activities in particular ways.  Those include: its 
ability to trade as a separate entity; its ability to structure ownership in particular ways, 
its ability to attract investment through a range of incentives and so on.  Those 
privileges are generally guaranteed by the rules of incorporation in a given national 
state.  Corporations are normally registered by the state for commercial purposes and 
are granted a legal identity.  This legal identity enables corporations to exist as an entity 
wholly separate from the individual identities of its owners or stockholders. It is this 
identity that enables corporations to assume a status as holder of particular rights, to 
own property and to exploit particular privileges such as ‘limited liability’.  As part of 
this process of incorporation, companies are permitted to establish complex ownership 
chains in which their operations are spread across a number of ‘formally separate’ 
companies.   
 
By foregrounding this deeper, constitutional, relationship, we are beginning to probe the 
a priori  - historically constituted - architecture of state-corporate power as part of what 
Tombs calls “a more generalized set of social relationships”.  In this sense, we are 
seeking to conceretise, following Lasslett, the “a broader system of production”, which 
in capitalist social orders, is organised around a process of capital accumulation.  In 
order to do so, we see the observable institutional relationship between ‘state’ and 
‘capital’ as merely an epiphenomena of a broader regime of permission, and therefore 
an epiphenomena of how capital accumulation is more generally reproduced through 
regulatory structures.  It is this understanding that can more fully illuminate the social 
content of corporate crimes.  And it is to this task that the rest of the paper turns. 
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The Regime of Permission from Galicia to Morecambe Bay 
 
Here we specify the regulatory process – or the regime of permission - that enables 
capital accumulation to be reproduced.   This is how we begin to discover the entirety of 
the social conditions that enable criminal and harmful practices to occur.   
 
The broader regime of permission that we point to can be usefully delineated into four 
major spheres, the categories that Marx called the ‘moments’ of capital accumulation: 
the spheres of production, distribution, exchange and consumption (Marx, 1993).  He 
argues that since production is the predominant sphere, the latter categories of 
distribution, exchange and consumption merely represent different stages or ‘moments’ 
in the life of a product.   However, the three other spheres also determine the form that 
production takes (ibid.).  In this analysis we are largely concerned with the social 
content of the spheres of production and distribution because this is most clearly where 
we can observe the regime of permission in our cases.  It is clear that there is a lot to be 
said about how the events that we describe here have impacted upon exchange and 
consumption, not least how the profound reshaping of seafood markets and the 
fluctuation of seafood prices in the wake of the Prestige undoubtedly had socially 
harmful effects (for example in the emergence of intensified demand, a decline in the 
quality of food products and so on).  Whilst this is beyond the scope of this paper, we 
would therefore stress that there is much to be learned from a fuller analysis of the 
spheres of exchange and consumption as part of the totality of the regime of permission. 
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Our priority here, however, is to see a little more clearly how both the Prestige and the 
Morecambe Bay disaster were made possible through a set of a priori social 
relationships that in each of those spheres of production and distribution are reproduced.   
By doing so, we uncover a highly complex regime of permission, a core part of which 
materialises in each case as a structure of impunity.  Though this analysis we can see 
precisely how the major players are the architects and key beneficiaries of each ‘crime’, 
but in its aftermath are permitted to continue as if nothing had happened.  
 
Although our case is largely a case of oil distribution, we offer our first set of 
observations, on the sphere of oil production, as context for understanding the social 
content of our case.   
 
Oil Production   
 
The regulatory practices that govern the production of oil are based upon one over-
riding principle: the permission to continue the extraction of oil at the most profitable 
rate of production. The regulation of oil production is highly regulated in this sense by 
oil producing states.  The US, as the major oil producing nation, controlled oil prices for 
the early half of the 20th century, ceding its influence to the OPEC countries in the 
1970s.  The current global dip in the price of oil is a result of the weakening of this 
system of production controls in the OPEC oil producing countries and a re-shifting of 
the balance back to Western producers (Harvey 2010; Arrighi, 1999). 
 
The sphere of exchange comes to life here since the regulation of production in oil 
markets is concerned largely with price regulation.  Of course, there are a complexity of 
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social and environmental regulatory structures that, for example, aim to mitigate spills 
and impose particular safety protections for workers.  Those standards apply differently 
across jurisdictions.  However, although they may impact on the conditions of 
production, those forms of regulation are not concerned with limiting the volume of 
production per se, but with minor adjustments to the way that oil is produced.   
Environmental controls are also imposed after the production process: at the stage that 
the product is used.  Thus, emissions controls on industry or on the use of road vehicles 
seek to limit use at the point of consumption. Thus, climate change treaties or 
international agreements that seek to mitigate the impact of the use of hydrocarbon fuels 
seek to limit carbon emissions. If there is a rudimentary system of regulation set out in 
agreements such as the Kyoto protocol, it is one that seeks to regulate the end point of 
the production cycle, rather than control the level of extraction per se.  Whilst our very 
truncated and selective over-review of some key of dynamics in the regulation of oil 
production may not seem empirically relevant to what follows (and the origin of the 
heavy fuel being transported by the Prestige is not known) we have in this section 
identified a core principle of regulation: a clear regime of permission principle at work, 
in which the potential harms of hydrocarbon production are subordinated to the 
production process itself. This is the broader regime of permission that frames our 
discussion here: one that sets the coordinates for understanding the principle on which 
the distribution of oil proceeds. 
 
Oil Distribution 
 
The regime of permission that is significant in the distribution of oil by sea is 
notoriously complex and fragmented.  Each nation state has its own regulatory structure 
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for merchant shipping. At the same time, there is an international treaty structure and a 
number of international organisations responsible for regulation. A UN organisation, the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) is responsible for developing and 
maintaining safety, environmental protection, and security issues relating to shipping. 
IMO regulations on the transportation of oil cover a range of issues including the 
technical specifications applying to ballast and stability, the location of oil storage on 
ships, the hull structure (single hull tankers are being phased out as a result of IMO 
double hull regulations), and the rules for assessing risk and reporting requirements. In 
this industry, a very specific process of regulating the ownership of vessels is organised 
under a system commonly known as using a ‘flag of convenience’ or ‘open register’. 
Employment practices in shipping are governed by other sets of regulations, namely the 
standards set by another UN organisation, the International Labour Organisation.   
 
However, a system of ‘flags of convenience’ generally enables national regulations to 
be flouted in marine employment.  This basically means that a vessel can be registered 
in a different national state than the ship’s owners under a ‘flag of convenience’ or 
‘open register’. Owners’ reasons for opting for an open register are many and varied and 
may include secrecy, tax avoidance, and avoiding national labour or environmental 
regulations.  Flags of convenience therefore make it difficult to obtain any detailed 
information about the company. In the case of the Prestige, the device of open 
registration served the owners well.  
 
As Hansen’s (2008) forensic analysis shows, the company that owned the Prestige, 
Mare Shipping, was registered in Liberia, a flag of convenience jurisdiction.  The oil 
tanker was chartered by a Swiss company, Crown Resources, also the owner of the 
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cargo who set it on course for Gibraltar where it was to wait for new instructions. 
Crown Resources itself was owned by a holding company based in Luxemburg, which 
in turn was owned by another holding company, based in Gibraltar, in turn owned by 
third company based in Liechtenstein. The third holding company was owned by Alpha 
Group, one of Russia’s largest investment fund groups that has major interests in 
commercial and investment banking, asset management, insurance, retail trade, water 
utilities, and a wide range of other investments. Alpha Group is therefore the real owner 
of the oil carried by the Prestige.  Using different companies located in several 
jurisdictions made the attribution of liability difficult. The countries outside Russia 
involved in this secondary chain of ownership (Luxembourg, Gibraltar and 
Liechtenstein) are all tax havens, and are known for the protection of commercial 
secrecy. This ownership chain, involving three different secrecy jurisdictions, made it 
difficult to obtain reliable information on the circumstances leading to the disaster. It is 
this complexity of the ownership chain that also minimized financial and reputation 
damages to the ultimate owners, Alpha Group.  Following the disaster, the various 
assets of Crown Resources were sold off in separate parts, and then reconstructed 
around a new enterprise, ‘Energy Resources’ and ‘Commodities Trading Company’ 
both based in Switzerland. This strategy enabled the real owners to further distance 
themselves from the Prestige disaster and to avoid accusations of wrongdoing, as well 
as continue trading in exactly the same way as before (Catalán Deus, 2003: 224-225).  
 
It took 14 years before a judgment in the Spanish Supreme Court in January ruled that 
Mare Shipping, along with the ship’s insurer were jointly liable for the spill (Spain. 
Supreme Court 11/2016).  It remains to be seen if there will be any action to recover the 
damages.  However, even if damages were sought, because they are owners of 
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incorporated businesses it is highly unlikely that the individual owners of those 
companies will be asked to pay full costs of the disaster.    
 
Instead, criminal responsibility has been focussed on the individuals involved in the 
immediate circumstances of the disaster.   A similar observation, as we shall see, can be 
made about the Morecambe Bay disaster.  The criminal trial of three men, the captain, 
the chief engineer and the Spanish government’s General Director of Marine Affairs, 
López Sors, began in Spain in November 2012 in the Audiencia Provincial de La 
Coruña, and was finally confirmed in the Spanish Supreme Court case in January 2016 
noted above.  The court delivered its sentence one year later, eleven years after the 
disaster.  The captain had been found guilty in an earlier case and sentenced to two 
years in prison (serving nine months of the sentence). Only the captain was found guilty 
of crimes against the environment. López Sors, the only representative of the Spanish 
government to be indicted was acquitted, even though the government’s negligence was 
clear: a Governing Committee was never constituted, no qualified personnel were sent 
to the ship, and the ship was knowingly sent into a storm and then ordered to change the 
direction several times, making a spill inevitable. Thus, the judgement against the 
captain effectively absolved both the government its responsibility for managing the 
crisis along with the owners of the oil and the vessel (Naucher, 2013).  
 
What we have described here is a series of complex regulatory mechanisms that 
originate in the process of capital accumulation, and in the way that a particular form of 
property ownership (the corporation) is reproduced in regulations that are universally 
applied across capitalist states.  Those mechanisms have reproduced a structure of 
impunity that enabled both the owners of the vessel and the oil to escape liability for the 
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disaster.  A crucial aspect of regimes of permission, is, in other words, revealed clearly 
here as a complex structure of impunity.   
 
This structure of impunity extended to the US regulator.  In a failed attempt to obtain 
compensation for the disaster (El País, 9th June, 2008), the Spanish government, instead 
of pursuing Mares Shipping or the Alpha Group, which would have proved difficult for 
reasons set out in the preceding discussion, attempted to prosecute the regulator that 
permitted the Prestige to operate, the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS).  In this case, 
the US courts ruled that Spain could not prove that the actions of ABS constituted a 
cause of the wreck of the Prestige. Spain made several arguments in the case. For the 
purposes of our paper, three of those arguments are significant. The first related to the 
failure to ensure compliance of standards relating to the inspection of condition of the 
vessel. After the Erika disaster off the coast of France in 1999, the ABS proposed that 
major classification organisations must adopt a number of measures, including 
classifying old tanks, organising annual inspections, and the mandatory use of the 
SafeHull program.  ABS had been accused of failing to act on knowledge of structural 
damage to the hull of the Prestige that it had possessed since 1996 (ibid.; Reino de 
España v. American Bureau of Shipping). The court found that although the regulations 
were not followed in the case of the Prestige, they were not mandatory at the moment of 
the wreck and thus ABS was not liable.  
 
The Prestige was inspected but remarkably, the results of the Marine Services 
inspection were not reported because the Crown Resources did not pay the fee that was 
due for the full inspection program.  This is remarkable, because the condition of the 
vessel was hidden simply because the Prestige’s charterer had refused to pay a statutory 
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fee.  Because of this and ABS’s failure to share the information of the previous tests 
with local surveyors, Spain alleged that ABS was reckless.  Spain additionally 
suggested that ABS was reckless as the Prestige’s then Captain Kostazos sent a fax to 
Marine Services in August 2002 alerting the regulator of the serious condition of the 
Prestige and asking for an emergency inspection.  According to the American court that 
since ABS was a parent company, then it could not be held liable for the knowledge 
held by its subsidiary company.  Spain could not prove that Marine Service ever 
informed ABS, or that ABS was aware of the issue; or even that the fax arrived to its 
destination.  Thus, the court dismissed the Spanish petition and decided that ABS had 
no legal responsibility for the condition of the Prestige (Reino de España v. American 
Bureau of Shipping).   The latter finding is particularly instructive, since we can discern 
a principle of outsourcing within the administration of the US regulatory system 
(Hansen, 2008).   It is this principle of outsourcing that enabled the regulator – as well 
as the owners of the vessel and the oil to escape liability! 
 
In sum, this structure of impunity ultimately ensured the status quo: the commercial 
strength of the corporate owners of the oil was maintained; the system of shipping 
regulation and of oil distribution remained unchallenged; and crucially, the pattern of 
ownership was undisrupted.  Those different forms of impunity, drawing upon a myriad 
of different legal structures and different institutional forms converge as part of the 
general regime of permission.   
 
Seafood Production 
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The production of seafood is, in general terms, regulated in ways that seeks to limit its 
environmental impacts at the point of production and to ensure a stable and sustainable 
fishing industry.  This is not to say various international mechanisms have been 
successful in meeting this aim.  But social protection is at least one of the stated aims of 
such regulatory policies.  International fishing limits, such as those imposed by the 
European Union are aimed at precisely this form of control (Pearse and Walters, 1992).  
The closure of the fishing grounds by the Spanish government following the Prestige 
disaster was done ostensibly to protect human health, but also to enable fish stocks to 
recover and be replenished.   As we have seen, one of the effects of this ultimately was 
to create a new set of risks to the safety of workers in UK shellfish production.  
 
In times of shortage or environmental disaster, production controls on cockle picking in 
Morecambe Bay are similarly imposed by a statutory government agency.  The 
regulator currently empowered to do this notes that its formal aim in law is to secure 
“the right balance between social, environmental and economic benefits to ensure 
healthy seas, sustainable fisheries and a viable industry.”2  At the time of the 
Morecambe Bay disaster, stocks were healthy, and therefore did not require such 
controls. 
 
Labour conditions in the production of seafood in the UK are the responsibility of a 
range of agencies.  Foremost amongst those is the Health and Safety Executive, 
responsible for enforcing safety standards that are designed to protect workers across 
the seafood production sites that are the concern of this paper.  In practice, however, in 
                                                 
2 North Western Inshore Fisheries And Conservation Authority Constitution March 2013, online at: 
http://www.nw-
ifca.gov.uk/contents/images/NWIFCA%20Constitution%20March%202013%20%28Final%29.pdf, 
viewed 6th April, 2016. 
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the context of the regulation of the undocumented labour market that the Morecambe 
Bay cockle pickers were part of, the regulatory authorities have neither the resources 
nor the political will to inspect and investigate unregistered enterprises and seek 
compliance or take enforcement action in this sector.  In any case workplace safety 
regulators are operating in an environment that is dominated by immigration control.  In 
the months and weeks leading up to disaster, cocklers on Morecambe might have had a 
chance of seeing immigration officers, but would have had little chance of seeing 
workplace safety regulators (for example, The Daily Mail, 23rd August, 2003).  
Certainly the level of state effort directed at controlling ‘illegal’ workers dwarfs the 
state effort that seeks to ameliorate the conditions that enable migrant workers to be 
exploited (Burnett and Whyte, 2010). 
  
Indeed, it is in this context that we must understand the prosecution of the Chinese 
‘gangmaster’ who employed the cockle pickers.  In March 2006, Lin Liang Ren was 
convicted for the manslaughter of 21 cockle pickers (by the time of the court case, two 
of the bodies had not recovered from the sea) and given a 14 year jail sentence.  Two 
others involved in their employment, Zhao Xiao Qing and Lin Mu Yong were also 
convicted of facilitating contraventions of immigration law. They were sentenced to two 
years and nine months, and four years and nine months respectively. The Liverpool Bay 
Fishing company that bought the cockles from Lin to sell on to larger producers were 
cleared of facilitating the crime. All of the larger market players: the canning factories, 
the exporters and the corporations marketing and selling the cockles were sufficiently 
distanced by the supply chain to prevent them from even being questioned in public 
discussion about their role in the deaths of the 24 workers.  The role of those players is 
discussed briefly in the section that follows. 
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Seafood Distribution  
 
Responsibility for seafood distribution is similarly spread across a complex chain of 
different entities.  A large part of the global demand for shellfish is driven by Spanish 
consumers. Indeed, the Spanish market is certainly the most important market for 
cockles in Europe, buying most of its cockles from European countries.  This market 
had previously been supplied mainly from Galicia (Pawiro, 2010). Recognising the 
opportunities in Britain, some of the Spanish companies moved in to buy cockles from 
producers they have not dealt with before.  One indication of this entry into the market 
by big Spanish players illustrated when in 2002 the Spanish company Conservas Dani 
bought a family-run firm based in Wales which had previously preferred to deal with 
established cocklers (Herbert and Nash, 2004). The net effect of the entry into the 
market of the large Spanish market players was therefore that pre-existing supply chains 
were re-configured. 
 
The intensification of market conditions had some very direct impacts on labour 
conditions.  An ongoing dispute between British and Chinese gangs of cocklers 
intensified during the months and weeks leading up to the disaster. The dispute was 
partly about the territorial rights to work the Bay, but was also fuelled by the 
assumption that Chinese labourers were gaining a competitive advantage because they 
were more likely to take risks than locally established cocklers. In the week before the 
disaster, buyers were being asked by British cocklers not to purchase cockles harvested 
by Chinese gangs (ibid.).   However, the reconfiguration of trading relationships in the 
industry most probably made it easier for new sellers of British-harvested cockles to 
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enter the market. Indeed, it was reported in court that the Liverpool Bay Fishing 
Company who would were buying the cockles from the direct employer of the 24 
workers were selling to the large Spanish market players (Daily Post, 20th September 
2005).  If the shift in conditions of the normal sites of shellfish production in Europe 
intensified demand for production in Britain, the restructuring of ownership patterns in 
the industry thus led to the repositioning of trading relationships in the industry. Those 
changes in economic relationships combined to create new opportunities for 
gangmasters employing Chinese workers to enter those markets.  
 
In the aftermath of Morecambe Bay, none of the key players in the labour market 
described above were even questioned, never mind investigated for their role in creating 
the conditions of the crime.  In many ways this is a very obvious point, for the structure 
of regulation in both the seafood and labour markets, and the regulatory regimes that 
governed those markets, enable the most powerful players to remain distant from the 
conditions of exploitation that they benefit from.  In this context it almost seems 
ludicrous to question why they were not prosecuted.  How could the most powerful 
players – the buyers of the cockles that existed several stages removed along the supply 
chain – possible be questioned when the likely destination of the cockles – and the 
source of the demand - was masked by a complex supply chain?   
 
The production and distribution of oil and seafood, though organised in different 
geographical and regulatory spaces are organised using the same principles.  There is a 
similar principle of outsourcing and fragmented structure of ownership across 
production and distribution in those industries.  It is this organised fragmentation that 
guarantees a number of crucial outcomes: cost reduction, labour casualization and 
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ultimately distancing the most powerful players from the entry-end of the supply chain.  
A complex regime of permission thus provides the foundations for capital accumulation 
before it establishes regulatory protections for the environment or workers. 
 
Conclusion 
   
Systematically drawing the connections across two connected ‘events’ reinforces the 
problems we face in focussing on immediately perceived criminal practices.  Both are 
disasters that must be understood as part of what Ruggiero (2013) has called the 
collateral damage of the market.  So both disasters are linked in this broad sense.   
Making those connections also demonstrates more specifically the inadequacies of a 
pre-occupation with either the moment of ‘failure’ of the state to regulate or control 
(and the state-corporate crime literature very often points to a deliberate failure), or with 
the moments at which we can identify visible collusion between states and corporations.  
 
Those state-corporate crimes were not explained by a breakdown in the regulatory 
function of the state; they occurred not because the state was disobeyed, but either 
because the state was obeyed, or merely because they had conformed to a pattern of 
social relations - embedded in particular social and economic practices - that has existed 
form many decades.   In neither case were the formative conditions of the criminogenic 
‘event’ found in particular decisions and actions or non-decisions and inactions of state 
or government institutions.  There were elements we could describe as state initiated or 
state facilitated, but those conditions don’t fully describe the state-corporate crimes 
here.   
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The circumstances that led to the Prestige and Morecambe Bay disasters can only be 
partially explained using a concept of state-corporate crime.   The corporate crimes we 
describe here emanate from an architecture of power in which states guarantee 
corporations various privileges and infrastructural capacities.  As we have noted in 
some detail here, the Prestige crisis was certainly aggravated as a consequence of the 
negligence of the US regulators, and the international systems of regulation.  In this 
sense, some elements of the Prestige can easily be described as state-facilitated.  But 
what was facilitated here?  It makes little sense to describe the immediate circumstances 
in those terms, since the US state had no direct stake in the structure of profit or 
ownership in this case.   Rather, it had a stake in a global regime of permission that 
enables capital accumulation from oil markets generally.   The Spanish state similarly 
benefits from this regime of permission. 
 
The response of the Spanish state to the disaster indicates the complexity of tracing any 
common goal here.  After all, the Spanish government clearly attributed the problem of 
regulation to the US state, as is indicated by its attempt to sue ABS.   This complexity is 
also illustrated also by the immediate response of the Spanish government in the 
ordering of the vessel to be towed out to sea away from Spanish waters, an order that 
was strongly resisted by the ship’s owners.  Again, if there is a common goal, it is not 
clear in relation to the immediate circumstances of the disaster, but at a very general 
level in the global regime of permission.  
 
It is a process of capital accumulation that is guaranteed and under-pinned at every turn 
by this complex regime of permission.  And this process of capital accumulation reveals 
much about the real structure of social relations.  The workers at Morecambe Bay died 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
28 
 
producing value for corporate players from a commodity that at some time in the past 
was a common resource.  Their position was made more vulnerable by the commodified 
distribution of another common resource, oil.   
 
If the social relations of expropriation and exploitation that created the Prestige and 
Morecambe Bay disasters are to be fundamentally challenged, then we must 
contemplate something more profound that a shift in the relationship between the state 
and the corporation. We must contemplate how we can sustainably manage common 
resources for the common good.  Clearly this is not possible under a capitalist regime of 
permission.  We must therefore begin to explore exactly how we can manage those 
resources under a different system of social relations, one in which corporations are no 
longer permitted to function in the way they currently are.   And to do so we need to 
think about how social relationship should be altered not merely in the conditions that 
we find in the moments of rupture, but in the social relations that are deeply conditioned 
in the moments of production, distribution, exchange and consumption. 
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